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Abstract In his important recent book, Ethics and the
Global Financial Crisis: Why Incompetence is Worse than
Greed (2015), Boudewijn de Bruin argues that a key ele-
ment of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 was a
failure of epistemic (i.e. knowledge-based) virtue. To
improve matters, then, de Bruin argues we need to focus on
the acquisition and exercise of epistemic virtues, rather
than to focus on a more ethical culture for banking per se.
Whilst this is an interesting suggestion and it is indeed very
plausible that an increased focus on proper knowledge-
related behaviour will be part of a solution, we are sceptical
both about de Bruin’s overarching theoretical claims and
about his practical suggestions for change. Instead we
argue that change in this sector is best promoted by
reconceiving of the relationship between financial institu-
tions and the societies they serve, and that this is funda-
mentally not an epistemic but a moral issue.
Keywords Ethical values in financial services  Responses
to the financial crisis  Financial literacy
Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007–2008 was one of the
most significant events of recent decades. However, very
little has been written from a philosophical perspective on
what was to blame for causing this event and how to avoid
a repeat crisis in the future. A welcome exception to this
lacuna is Boudewijn de Bruin’s book Ethics and the Global
Financial Crisis: Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed
(2015). De Bruin’s book manifests impressive philosophi-
cal expertise and extensive knowledge about economics in
general and financial services in particular. Moreover, the
book marshals intriguing arguments to make novel sug-
gestions about the nature of the financial crisis and about
how to reduce the risk of future ones.
The main thesis of de Bruin’s book is that problems in
the financial services sector leading up to the crisis, and on
display in subsequent scandals in the sector, are more
accurately described as failures of epistemic (i.e. knowl-
edge-related) virtue than as failures of moral virtue. As the
sub-title of the book suggests, his idea is that incompetence
(and in particular epistemic incompetence) is more prob-
lematic in the sector than greed (and, we take it, more
problematic than any other relevant non-epistemic moral
failing).
The idea that epistemic failings had some role to play in
the crisis is of course unarguable. For instance, no one
could object to the idea that the firms that bought and sold
the highly complex mortgage-backed security products that
bundled up over-leveraged sub-prime US mortgages should
have been more epistemically diligent in discovering the
real risk associated with those products. However, from the
recognition that epistemic failures had some role to play in
the crisis, it is a significant step to the theoretical model,
and practical implications, that de Bruin recommends. In
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particular, beyond the unarguable role for improved epis-
temic practices, de Bruin also needs to establish two further
claims:
• First, that the undeniable requirement that epistemic
practices be improved is best understood in terms of the
theoretical framework of epistemic virtue theory (of the
kind that de Bruin offers).
• Second, that the epistemic virtue theory thus elaborated
provides the best way to think about the crisis and
subsequent scandals.
In this paper, we argue against both these further
claims. That is, we argue that the move to epistemic
virtue theory is unnecessary and that the evident epis-
temic failures were no more than one small part of the
story, with the overarching problem being one of a
moral, not epistemic, failure. Furthermore, this argument
matters, because the way that policy analysts conceive of
the crisis will affect the moves they take to be necessary
to help safeguard against future problems. Thus, as we
will explain, because we disagree with de Bruin about
the best way to conceive of the crisis, we also disagree
with him about the steps needed to ameliorate matters in
this area.
The structure of the paper is as follows: §1 provides an
overview of de Bruin’s account. §2 turns to the question of
whether or not the evident epistemic failings on display
both pre- and post-crisis are best understood in terms of
epistemic virtue theory and this section goes on to offer
some initial reasons to be sceptical about this claim. Then
§3 turns to our main argument: that de Bruin is mistaken to
conceive of the crisis in terms of a failure of epistemic
virtue. We argue, first, that de Bruin has failed to provide
an appropriate normative ground for the epistemic virtues
to which he appeals, second, that he has failed to knock out
relevant alternatives to his proposed account, and third, that
an account in terms of epistemic virtues provides no clear
pathway to practical improvements. Furthermore, as we
argue in §4, the alternatives to de Bruin’s approach give
rise to a different way to view the crisis—as emerging from
a failure by the large financial institutions to properly
recognize and act in line with their special social role. We
argue that de Bruin is wrong to dismiss the idea that banks
have a special status within the business world and that
recognition of this special status helps to clarify the kinds
of concrete steps which need to be taken both to rebuild
warranted public trust in the sector and to help safeguard
against future financial crises. We close by restating why
this issue matters—why it is important that we not only
identify the true nature of the failings during and after the
global financial crisis but also take steps to restore war-
ranted trust in the sector by safeguarding against these
failings in the future.
The Nature of the Global Financial Crisis
The fact that many banks needed rescuing during the crisis
by the state or by foreign investors/states has undermined
public confidence in their competence. And scandals in the
sector, such as mis-selling of payment protection insurance
and colluding in fixing the Libor, have led the public to
believe that banks prioritize profit at the cost of any other
consideration (short of illegality).1 To compound matters
here, the standard mechanisms for curbing poor beha-
viour—reputational damage and the imposition of financial
penalties—are widely held to be insufficiently effective.2
Another complaint against the banks is that they ‘‘pri-
vatized gains and socialized losses’’. Over a number of
years, banks made huge profits by taking unreasonable
risks. They sold very risky sub-prime mortgages and let
their capital ratios get very low. These turned out to be
risks with bad consequences. And these bad consequences
were not just for the people who owned or worked for the
banks. Because the banks were so foundational to our
economy that they were thought to be ‘‘too big to let fail’’,
governments decided to prevent failure in most cases. So
the bad consequences of selling very risky sub-prime
mortgages and letting banks’ capital ratios get very low
were also for society’s tax payers, who had to pick up the
bill.
Now if the banks had been willing to take on the
unreasonable risks precisely because of an expectation on
1 Of course, one might think that pursuit of shareholder value as the
primary objective is written into law, so that banks (along with all
other corporations) have no choice but to pursue profit above all else.
However, legislative frameworks do recognise the existence of
secondary duties. For instance, Section 172 of the UK Companies Act
2006 notes that company directors must have regard to ‘‘the interests
of the company’s employees, the company’s relationships with its
suppliers and customers, the impact of the company’s operations on
the community and the environment, and the desirability of the
company maintaining a reputation of high standards’’. It is then the
capacity of banks to balance these primary and secondary duties
which we take it the public have lost confidence in post-crisis.
2 For instance surveys apparently show an on-going acceptance
within the industry of misbehaviour (e.g. Wall Street, Fleet Street and
Main Street: Corporate Integrity at a Crossroads 2012) and despite
record levels of fines imposed on the sector, scandals continue to
come to light. As the G30’s recent report Banking Conduct and
Culture (2015, p. 21) states, ‘‘At the time this report was drafted,
cumulative fines for the largest global banks exceeded US$300 billion
since the financial crisis (McLannahan 2015). The extent to which
these losses are becoming a prudential issue is illustrated by the US
Federal Reserve’s 2014 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review
exercise (US Federal Reserve 2015), which revealed that operational
risk losses for 25 US banks amounted to about US$150 billion over
nine quarters, the majority of which related to litigation losses and
were comparable to the credit losses incurred by the banks. In part
driven by these losses, bank returns are well below expected return-
on-equity hurdles, and average valuations are well below historical
standards’’.
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their part that the state would prevent their failure or
because of a blindness to the potential impact of taking on
such risks, then here was ‘‘moral hazard’’ on a massive
scale. The term ‘‘moral hazard’’ refers to a structural
unfairness: one person or group is able to make decisions
where all or most of whatever benefits that will result will
go to this person or group, and yet, if the decisions instead
turn out to result in harms, these harms will be borne
mainly by others. When the banks were making large
profits, most of their profits (only most because there was
of course tax paid) were going to their shareholders and
employees. When huge net profit turned to huge net loss,
the state had to pay, since the banks were deemed ‘‘too big
to let fail’’. Those outside the banks resented getting stuck
with (most of) the bill after having had no part in the
decisions that generated that bill and only benefited from
the earlier profits to the extent that those profits were taxed.
Pummelled by such criticisms, the banking sector lost
the public’s trust. A key step in improving the sector, and
thus providing grounds for restoring trust, must be the
correct identification of the failures that led to the banking
crisis. Without the correct identification of the failures that
led to the banking crisis, we are unlikely to hit upon suc-
cessful safeguards against reoccurrence.
Boudewijn de Bruin has recently argued that the prob-
lem behind the crisis was not (predominantly) greed or an
overweening emphasis on the profit motive, but was rather
a specific kind of incompetence. The problem, he suggests,
lay with a failure (on behalf of both professionals and
customers) to realize basic epistemic virtues, such as:
• Love of knowledge
• Courage (in assessing evidence and revising and
expressing beliefs)
• Justice (giving fair hearing to opposing positions)
• Temperance (balancing the right amount of inquiry,
warrant and belief formation)
• Humility (seeking a wide range of opinions and
avoiding arrogance)
• Epsitemic generosity
De Bruin’s discussion is valuable at least in part because
there is always a need to be reminded that individuals and
businesses should
(a) be inquisitive,
(b) seek evidence,
(c) be unbiased and impartial about sources of evidence
(people who aren’t white, aren’t male, aren’t Chris-
tian, etc., shouldn’t be distrusted just because they
aren’t white, aren’t male, aren’t Christian, etc.),
(d) test propositions and evidence where possible,
(e) soberly form beliefs supported by the evidence,
(f) listen to other people’s criticisms of these beliefs,
(g) stick to the beliefs justified by the evidence even
when these beliefs are unpopular or inconvenient,
(h) be humble about one’s own fallibility, and
(i) share knowledge freely with others, except when
some people (e.g. customers, clients, shareholders,
employees) have a right that the information be kept
confidential.
However, whilst the benefits of the epistemic practices
listed in (a)–(i) are unassailable, de Bruin needs to establish
two further, non-trivial, theses to arrive at his account of
the crisis in terms of epistemic virtue theory. First, he needs
to establish the thesis that the kinds of epistemic behaviour
listed in (a)–(i) are themselves best understood, from a
theoretical point of view, in terms of virtue epistemology.
Second, and most importantly from our current perspec-
tive, he needs to establish the thesis that the financial crisis
is best viewed in terms of such a virtue epistemology, with
the upshot that moves to safeguard against future problems
should focus on ways to encourage the acquisition and
exercise of epistemic virtues.
We will argue that de Bruin does not succeed in
establishing either of these further theses. The next section
looks at the relationship between good epistemic practices
and the theoretical approach of virtue epistemology. ‘‘Re-
jecting the Epistemic Virtue Theory Approach to the
Financial Crisis and Subsequent Scandals’’ section exam-
ines the claim that the financial crisis should be viewed in
terms of a failure of epistemic virtue.
Is Good Epistemic Behaviour Best Understood
in Terms of Epistemic Virtues?
Virtue epistemology holds that epistemic virtues ‘‘motivate
and enable people to perform investigative actions and
adopt beliefs in ways that enlarge the likelihood of gaining
knowledge to the extent that this is necessary for reaching
other goals they have’’ (2015, p. 70).3 As we said, de Bruin
points to the virtues of love of knowledge, epistemic jus-
tice, epistemic temperance, epistemic courage, epistemic
humility, and epistemic generosity. We wonder whether
these epistemic virtues are anything over and above the
dispositions and kinds of behaviours listed in (a)–(i). If
they are not, then we think de Bruin owes some further
account of what is gained by the move to the more theory-
laden talk of virtues. On the other hand, if the virtues are
3 Many virtue epistemologists take knowledge to be valuable for its
own sake. De Bruin might agree with that idea but he doesn’t rely on
it. Instead he takes knowledge to be instrumentally valuable to
achieve other goals (2015: 70). Most relevant here will be the goal of
business, which typically is to maximize the value of shares in the
business, subject to certain legal and moral side-constraints, as Milton
Friedman contended.
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something more than the dispositions and behaviours in
(a)–(i) then it would be good to be told more about what
this difference is.
De Bruin periodically suggests that virtue epistemology
should be understood in terms of the Aristotelian ‘‘doctrine
of the mean’’. In many cases, this suggestion seems
implausible. Here is one example. Epistemic justice con-
sists in being unbiased and impartial about sources of
evidence. We agree of course that testimony from someone
should not be ignored or discounted merely because of that
person’s race, religion, national origin, gender, etc. But we
cannot see how either epistemic justice (i.e. unbiased
impartiality) is perspicuously conceived of as a mean
between extremes. To take another example, epistemic
generosity does not seem perspicuously described as a
mean between extremes. Of course, the disposition to
provide information when others (e.g. colleagues, cus-
tomers, regulators) have a right to that information can be
juxtaposed with the disposition to withhold information
when others (e.g. shareholders, clients) have a right that the
information remains confidential. But that there is this
juxtaposition hardly entails that there is a virtuous mean
between the extremes.
Admittedly, there are varieties of virtue epistemology
that do not rely on the doctrine of the mean. Maybe some
such variety can be shown to be helpful to business ethics.
However, we contend that more work would be needed to
show that the unobjectionable points captured by (a)–
(i) really are best rendered within the theoretical frame-
work of virtue theory which de Bruin recommends.
Rejecting the Epistemic Virtue Theory Approach
to the Financial Crisis and Subsequent Scandals
Rejecting De Bruin’s Argument for the Normative
Ground of Epistemic Virtues
For de Bruin’s argument to go through, there must be a
normative force for the epistemic virtues—that is to say,
they must be things we are in some way required to
acquire. To provide this normative grounding, de Bruin
appeals to an antecedent commitment in the financial ser-
vices sector to what he terms the ‘‘Argument from Lib-
erty’’, where the premises of the argument are as follows:
Argument from Liberty (de Bruin 2015: 35–36)
1. It is a good thing to increase the personal responsi-
bility people have for satisfying their own preferences.
2. Increasing freedom of choice leads to an increase in
the personal responsibility people have for satisfying
their own preferences.
3. Liberalization (i.e. reducing restrictions on freedom of
enterprise) increases freedom of choice.
De Bruin ascribes acceptance of these premises to,
amongst many others, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher,
Bill Clinton, and Tony Blair (2015: 44) and suggests that
these ideas have been influential in reforming policy in
countries ranging from China, India, Mexico, and Ghana,
to South Africa. De Bruin notes, ‘‘This reasoning inspired,
amongst other things, the privatization of pension schemes
in the UK and the liberalization of legal regulations on
mortgage lending in the United States’’ (2015: 36–37). The
rationale that the financial services industry offers for
opposing restrictions on freedom of enterprise is that such
restrictions get in the way of customers’ optimizing the
allocation of their resources and thus get in the way of
customers’ maximizing their wealth and well-being (2015:
43). So the financial services industry is de facto com-
mitted to the Argument from Liberty.
Before we engage with de Bruin’s own discussion of the
Argument from Liberty, we should note that the argument,
as de Bruin lays it out, is incomplete as the conclusion is
left implicit. What is the conclusion supposed to be? Pre-
sumably, it is:
Conclusion: liberalization is a good thing.
However, to drive this conclusion validly, the argument
needs a fourth premise:
4. Something that leads to a good thing is itself a good
thing.
This extra premise, in this unqualified version, would be
difficult to defend. True, many good things lead to other
good things. However, it is also the case that many good
things are caused by things that are in themselves neither
good nor bad. Furthermore, the real problem is that
sometimes something bad leads to something good. Here
are two of countless possible examples. War is bad and
social solidarity is good, but war can lead to social soli-
darity. Disease (in something good) is bad and love (of a
good thing) is good, but John (who is good) becomes
diseased and then John’s disease leads to Sukh’s loving
him.
In the light of such obvious counterexamples to premise
4, we would have to qualify 4 to:
4*. Something that leads to a good thing is good in at
least one respect—namely in leading to that good
thing.
But now the problem for the Argument from Liberty is
that:
Conclusion: liberalization is a good thing.
E. Borg, B. Hooker
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needs to be more qualified. Once premise 4 is replaced with
premise 4*, the conclusion that can be validly drawn is the
much more modest:
Conclusion*: liberalization is good in at least one
respect.
This much more modest conclusion is perfectly com-
patible with acknowledging that liberalization is bad on
balance, that is, once all things are considered.
We suggest, then, that it is not possible to deliver a
version of the Argument from Liberty which is both valid
and capable of supporting the conclusion that most pro-
ponents of the argument presumably want (namely, that
liberalization is good simpliciter, or at least on balance
once all things are considered). Instead of criticizing the
Argument from Liberty along such lines, however, de
Bruin writes, ‘‘my interest in the argument is mainly driven
here by the project of finding a normative starting point of
epistemic virtue. I do think of the argument as potentially a
quite powerful source of policymaking, but only if a
number of epistemic assumptions be satisfied, which it is
the unwarranted tendency of many commentators and
policymakers to neglect.’’ (2015, p. 36) De Bruin makes
the excellent point against a general application of the
Argument from Liberty that it presumes people are aware
of and understand the choices they are being offered.
People’s doing what they want is unlikely to maximize
their wealth and well-being if their preferences are based
on ignorance, misunderstanding, illusion, unreliable infor-
mation, or illogical reasoning (2015, p. 40). In de Bruin’s
words, ‘‘people need genuine knowledge to benefit from
increased freedom’’ (2015, p. 43). Likewise, insofar as the
focus is on increasing people’s responsibility for their own
choices and welfare, people need to know what courses of
action or inaction are available to them, what the possible
consequences are of these, and what the probabilities of
these consequences are (2015, p. 41).
So far, we have seen that the Argument from Liberty
presumes people need knowledge. If we distinguish having
knowledge from having epistemic virtue, we have not yet
seen why the Argument from Liberty presumes people
need epistemic virtue. A plausible idea is that knowledge
and understanding are very unlikely in the absence of
epistemic virtue. We will return to this idea later, after
raising some other worries.
A first worry is that, even if de Bruin is right that there is
a de facto acceptance of the Argument from Liberty by
financial institutions, it is a further question whether
financial institutions are right to accept the argument.
Perhaps the Argument from Liberty should be rejected (de
Bruin acknowledges this question can be raised (2015:
42–43)). If the Argument from Liberty should be rejected,
a further question is posed: would the normative ground for
the epistemic virtues be lost if we reject the Argument from
Liberty, at least as it stands?4 If the normative ground for
the epistemic virtues is tied to the Argument from Liberty,
de Bruin should have provided a stronger argument for
accepting the Argument from Liberty itself.
A second worry here concerns how the appeal to the
Argument from Liberty sits within de Bruin’s overall
conception of what a financial institution is. He discusses at
some length how we should construe institutions and ulti-
mately assumes (he says for the sake of argument) an
extremely minimal conception of what a corporation is.
Following Milton Friedman, de Bruin conceives of a cor-
poration as a fictional body introduced to facilitate volun-
tary contracts. On this view, there are no properties other
than this that are necessary in order for something to be a
corporation. As corporations, financial institutions have no
necessary goals, although of course there will be the goals
of individuals within these corporations. De Bruin writes,
‘‘It is a category mistake to derive a corporate purpose from
[these] multifarious individual purposes’’ (2015: 31).
However, we might wonder whether the ‘‘category
mistake’’ is assigning a corporate purpose per se or
assigning a purpose derived from individual goals.
Admittedly, in line with the Fallacy of Composition, there
need be no purpose that can be simply extracted from the
goals of individual members. But avoiding the Fallacy of
Composition does not preclude recognizing the possibility
of some kind of emergent purpose.
A familiar case here in favour of the possibility of
emergent purposes is the function of an army: X, Y, Z may
each have a goal of defending only their own family and
goods; however, they realize that it would be more effec-
tive to join together to prevent attack. Thus they form an
army, which has an emergent goal of defending the whole
territory (a goal not endorsed by any individual indepen-
dent of the formation of the army). If this kind of institu-
tion-level purpose is possible, then Friedman’s and de
Bruin’s minimal conception of a corporation can be resis-
ted, in favour of a more substantive account that leaves
room for ‘‘the proper function of a financial institution’’ to
4 One possible reason to reject the Argument from Liberty stems
from the fact that research suggests that choice maximization (beyond
a certain point) is in fact detrimental to agents, e.g. work in social
psychology shows that people are less satisfied when making choices
in the face of very large numbers of options (choosing an ice cream in
a shop that has too many flavours, buying coffee from a chain with a
large number of possible drink variations) and it is wrong to think that
this loss of utility occurs only ‘‘because we cannot see the wood for
the trees and lack full knowledge of our decision situation’’ (de Bruin
2015: 43). We might have full knowledge of the different flavours;
what overwhelms is the sheer variety. De Bruin is right that the
problem occurs ‘‘when we do not know how to distinguish
alternatives [and] start feeling overpowered and unable to choose’’
(2015: 43), but it’s not more knowledge that will help here—it may be
that nothing epistemic will improve the situation.
Epistemic Virtues Versus Ethical Values in the Financial Services Sector
123
be something more than merely facilitating voluntary
contracts.5
De Bruin might accept this point, for he explicitly notes
that he advocates the minimal conception of a corporation
only for the sake of argument. His aim is to show that the
normative construal of the epistemic virtues can be prop-
erly grounded without making any substantial assumptions
about the nature of corporations at all. If a more substantial
conception of a corporation turns out to be correct (say one
which allows for institutional purposes), taking on board
this more substantial conception of a corporation might still
be perfectly compatible with de Bruin’s stance. (Whether
or not this more substantial conception of a corporation is
compatible with de Bruin’s stance depends of course on
what this conception is.)
Yet even if we set that point aside and grant to de Bruin
his minimal conception of a corporation, there remains a
problem here for him. Given the extremely minimal con-
ception of a corporation he adopts, is he then entitled to
maintain that financial corporations must be committed to
the Argument from Liberty? If a financial corporation is
nothing more than a nexus of voluntary contracts, there
seems little reason to assume that this corporation pos-
sesses a commitment to anything (perhaps beyond those
contracts). It seems odd that de Bruin on the one hand
adopts such a minimal account of what a corporation is and
yet on the other seems to adopt such a substantive view of
what a corporation accepts or views as desirable. Yet if the
minimal conception of a corporation is incompatible with
the idea that financial corporations must be committed to
the Argument from Liberty, then we do not in fact have the
normative grounding for the epistemic virtues that de Bruin
promised. To provide the normative ground that de Bruin
promised, he has to show that financial institutions, as
minimally construed, are committed to the Argument from
Liberty. We are sceptical that this can be shown.
Finally, whilst de Bruin is right to note that there is a
place for improved epistemic practices here and that reg-
ulators ‘‘have to acknowledge that the mere provision of
information concerning freedom is only partly going to
address the needs of people facing financing decisions’’
(2015: 90)—i.e. as we might put it: information is not the
same thing as knowledge—still he seems wrong to main-
tain that this reveals a special place for epistemic virtues
over a focus on ethics more generally. For even if de Bruin
is granted the special place he wants for the Argument from
Liberty, still this argument has other preconditions besides
the epistemic ones. For the Argument from Liberty to
work, customers need practical virtues (e.g. courage,
strength of will) to exercise their choice and they must have
the political liberty and financial resources to put into
effect a preference for one basket of goods and activities
rather than another. So the Argument from Liberty itself
requires more than epistemic virtues. Thus, even on de
Bruin’s favoured conception of the landscape, knowledge
matters but certainly isn’t the whole story.
Rejecting the Claim that Internalization
of Epistemic Virtue is the Best Way to Address
the Problem
De Bruin’s positive answer to the question of how things
can be improved in the sector is that agents need to acquire
and exercise epistemic virtues (2015: chs. 3, 4). We
counter with the observation that the epistemic worries
themselves could be addressed in ways that need not
involve internalizing the virtues. For instance, consider the
epistemic asymmetry that exists between customers and
professionals in the financial sector, such that customers
are often lacking in both the kind of financial literacy
required to understand the products on offer to them and
are often lacking in the appropriate kinds of information
required to allow them to make a well-informed decision.
There are two obvious ways in which to address this
problem. First, an attempt might be made to improve the
financial literacy of customers (potential as well as actual)
of financial services. Second, customers might be encour-
aged to get more and better advice. Of course, both these
options might be taken together—improving the financial
literacy of customers and offering them better financial
advice. However, de Bruin assesses them as separate
options. And he argues that neither of these two alternative
moves is adequate.
First, considering moves to improve financial literacy,
de Bruin (2015: 72–73) cites a study showing that uni-
versity students who had undergone a nineteen-hour
financial literacy programme were more likely to purchase
less comprehensive health insurance policies, thereby tak-
ing a higher risk. He concludes (2015: 73) that there is no
proven connection between financial literacy and intelli-
gent investment: ‘‘[T]o date, no study seems to have
broached the topic of the correlation between financial
literacy and wise investment’’.
Second, he argues against treating the provision of
financial advice (customers’ taking financial advice is a
prime example of what he terms ‘‘outsourcing epistemic
responsibility’’) as an adequate solution. He provides four
considerations against treating the provision of financial
advice as an adequate solution. First, trust in financial
advisors has diminished (2015: 73). Second, those most in
need of financial advice are the least likely to buy it (2015:
73–74). Third, people often don’t do what advisors suggest
(2015: 74). Fourth, although some evidence suggests that
5 See Mayer (2013) for an excellent and thought-provoking discus-
sion of the nature, and thus the purpose, of corporations in general.
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requiring customers to seek financial advice does improve
financial outcomes (2015: 103), this may be through
ancillary effects (e.g. that such legislation reduces the
provision of financial services to high risk clients—banks
stop offering mortgages to those required to seek advice).
From these considerations, de Bruin concludes that the
way forward is not to try to improve customers’ financial
literacy or to provide customers with financial advice, but
for customers to internalize and practice the epistemic
virtues (2015: 74):
The question … is not what levels of knowledge
about finance are sufficient for adequate financial
planning. On the contrary, I investigate the epistemic
virtues leading people to acquire the knowledge and
the vices that result in their failing to do so. Doing
this suggests ways to strengthen financial literacy.
But financial literacy is not always accompanied by
epistemic virtue, nor does financial illiteracy imply
epistemic vice by necessity.
As this passage indicates, de Bruin maintains that financial
literacy and advice are distinct from epistemic virtue in this
area, with financial literacy and advice being neither
necessary nor sufficient for epistemic virtue.
Of course, we agree that financial literacy is possible
without epistemic virtue (‘‘financial literacy is not always
accompanied by epistemic virtue’’). However, de Bruin
also claims that one can fail to have financial literacy (i.e.
be in a position of financial illiteracy) and still have epis-
temic virtue (or at least absence of epistemic vice—‘‘nor
does financial illiteracy imply epistemic vice by neces-
sity’’). We doubt that, in today’s increasingly complex
financial marketplace, there are many people who have
epistemic virtue with respect to financial matters and yet
do not have at least a significant degree of financial liter-
acy. As a matter of conceptual analysis and metaphysical
necessity, we acknowledge that, since literacy/illiteracy
and virtue/vice are contrasts of scalar terms, there is room
for argument about whether one must have at least minimal
financial literacy in order to have at least minimal epis-
temic virtue about financial matters. As a practical matter,
however, we think that nowadays no one could be plausibly
described as epistemically virtuous about financial matters
if this person was almost completely illiterate about such
matters.
Furthermore, and even more problematic for de Bruin, if
financial literacy and advice were able to solve the prob-
lems, this independence would show that a move towards
epistemic virtue was not necessary for addressing the
problems here. Moreover, we are not persuaded by de
Bruin’s arguments against trying to improve customers’
financial literacy and against providing customers with
financial advice. The fact that financial literacy is difficult
to improve certainly does not in itself militate against
attempts to improve it. Perhaps the attempt just needs more
effort (after all, lots of worthwhile goals are difficult to
achieve). Furthermore, only one study is cited to show that
financial education doesn’t help.6 So the evidence base for
dismissing financial education is far too thin.
De Bruin’s argument against the provision of financial
advice is even weaker. First, the worry that trust in finan-
cial advisors has declined doesn’t speak against provision
of advice; it speaks in favour of improving levels of
trustworthiness of financial advice. Second, the worry that
those most in need of financial advice are least likely to
buy it speaks in favour of provision of free or very inex-
pensive advice, not in favour of no advice at all. Third, the
recognition that people often don’t do what advisors advise
may point to possible problems with the way advice is
provided. But in general if people ignore appropriate and
appropriately given advice without good reason, then they
have to shoulder the liability for their decisions; otherwise,
personal responsibility is undermined.
We therefore contend that the options de Bruin rejects—
improving customers’ financial literacy and education and
the provision of good, accessible financial advice to cus-
tomers—remain firmly on the table as ways to reduce the
risk of further problems in this sector. The combination of
these options does not entail the acquisition or practice of
full epistemic virtue by customers. Yet these options seem
to us to be very valuable, especially in combination.
Rejecting the Idea that an Appeal to Epistemic
Virtue has Practical Application
The correct understanding of the failings in the financial
services sector during and after the crisis of 2007–2008
might well suggest practical ways to try to avoid problems
in the future. Yet the degree to which de Bruin’s appeal to
epistemic virtues can really help us in this respect is
unclear.
First, the proposal that customers should acquire the
epistemic virtues needed to make wise choices themselves
looks even more problematic in practice than the options de
Bruin rejects. For instance, products change and multiply,
terminology mutates, advertising manipulates, and fashions
swirl. In the context of such change and complexity, it is
highly unlikely that sufficient epistemic virtue could be
developed in nearly all customers of mortgages and other
financial services to protect them from ruinous contracts.
6 It is also unclear in the cited study that the students really are
investing unwisely: given their age (and thus the statistical improb-
ability of serious illness in the short term) together with other calls on
their resources, it may be that the best investment strategy for the
students was to opt for cheaper health insurance.
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Second, not all of the activities that contributed to the
financial crisis could be explained by lack of epistemic
virtue. For instance, consider the behaviour of the credit
rating agencies (CRAs)—such as Moody’s, Standard &
Poor’s, and Fitch—that rated complex mortgage-backed
security products. The reluctance of CRAs to adjust the
ratings of those products to reflect the value of the under-
lying assets (in particular following an upward spiral in
sub-prime mortgage defaults) seems to have been the result
of inherent conflicts of interest rather than a failure in
epistemic virtue.7 This example illustrates how a focus on
epistemic virtue alone won’t address all issues.
Finally, it is difficult to see how requiring professionals
and consumers to acquire and exercise epistemic virtues
could be sensibly mandated by regulatory statutes. Finan-
cial regulation in the UK is focused fundamentally on
duties, not on virtues. For regulations to bring about
abstract and qualitative virtues such as love of knowledge,
courage, temperance and humility would be difficult,
unless these regulations were couched in terms of sub-
stantiate positive requirements (in which case, one might
think that it was these substantive requirements, rather than
the appeal to epistemic virtue per se, which really mattered
here).8
So, in light of our questions about whether good epis-
temic practices really need to be understood in terms of
virtue epistemology (§1), about whether de Bruin estab-
lishes a normative ground for epistemic virtues (§2.i),
about whether he successfully shows that the situation can
only or best be improved by the customers’ acquisition of
epistemic virtues (§2.ii), and about whether a requirement
for epistemic virtue can realistically be embedded within
regulatory statutes (§2.iii), we conclude that the case for
prioritizing epistemic virtue as a means of averting another
global financial crisis is far from proven.
Having argued against de Bruin’s recommendation that
the way forward is to prioritize epistemic virtue, we will
devote the next sections to making some positive sugges-
tions about how to move forward, both in terms of con-
ceptualizing the issues and in terms of practical steps.
Banks and Their Relationship to Society
De Bruin argues (2015: 33–34) that the financial services
industry should not be viewed as occupying a special place
in the world of business: ‘‘In some sense … things that
banks do are things we could do for ourselves’’. For
instance, the role of supplying credit between lenders and
borrowers could be organized and enacted on an individual
level, although obviously this would be less efficient than
having the relationship mediated by a bank.
We sharply disagree with the idea that the financial
services industry does not occupy a special place. From a
practical perspective, financial services carried out on a
community-wide scale certainly couldn’t be left to the
whims of individuals. If every time someone needed an
overdraft or a small business wanted credit they had to
embark on an individual search for a personal creditor, this
would be unstable and hugely inefficient and result in
vastly less economic growth. The same would be true of
individuals with assets that could be lent and the search for
trustworthy borrowers. (De Bruin acknowledges these
points, 2015: 33–34.) In addition, the role of banks in
further financial services (such as providing custodial and
management services to pension funds, holding govern-
ment bonds) is not something that could be easily devolved
to individuals. Furthermore, such services as providing
safety of deposits and reasonable credit are pivotal to the
functioning of productive, innovative, and efficient
economies. The vast majority of people in developed
economies benefit from having available the services pro-
vided by banks. In this sense, as has been recognized
elsewhere, the social role of the big banks seems more akin
to that of the big utilities.9 Finally, the financial services
sector occupies a special place in at least some economies
7 This is one of the points at the heart of The Big Short, the 2015 film
about the financial crisis.
8 Thanks are due to Shazia Khan-Afghan for discussion of this point.
9 For instance, this was a topic of discussion at the World Economic
Forum in 2009 and has more recently been debated in light of moves
urging banks to provide banking services to the currently unbanked.
For instance, in a letter to bank CEO’s in 2016, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau in the US wrote: ‘‘…having a checking
account or a reloadable prepaid account enables consumers to receive
wages and benefits, make payments, store funds, and manage their
day-to-day lives. These functions are essential to both financial
viability and economic mobility, and they represent the enormous
value that your institution provides to a large number of Americans on
a regular basis’’ (see http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_
letter-to-banks-on-lower-risk-accounts.pdf). Note that arguing that the
big banks occupy a similar social role to the big utility companies
does not necessarily entail the view that they should be subject to
exactly the same kinds of regulatory regimes, although the two views
are often run together. For instance, in a speech in February 2016,
Minnesota Federal Reserve President Neel Kashkari, addressing the
problem of banks that are too big to fail, suggested as one option
turning them into public utilities by forcing them ‘‘to hold so much
capital that they virtually can’t fail (with regulation akin to that of a
nuclear power plant)’’; source: https://www.theguardian.com/busi
ness/2016/feb/16/finacial-crash-bank-bailout-2008-neel-kashkari-us-
banks-too-big-to-fail. One reason for thinking matching regulatory
regimes would not be well-advised concerns the need for innovation
in the financial services sector, which does not seem to be present in
the same way within the utility sector. Furthermore, a bank required
to hold sufficient capital to make failure virtually impossible would
probably not be profitable. At the very least, then, imposing massive
capital requirements on banks would probably lead to a huge growth
in alternative institutions (such as the FinTechs) which would not be
classified as banks and would thus avoid crippling capital constraints
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because of its scale (e.g. the gross value added for financial
corporations—FINCOs—in the UK in 2013 was £250
billion).10 Since the crisis, in recognition of the special
importance that financial institutions have to society, tax-
payers (at least in a number of countries including the UK)
have become the lenders of last resort for at least some
financial institutions.
The combination of these aspects of the big banks
supports the idea that they have a special relationship with
the societies to which they belong. Because of this special
relationship to society, big banks are granted special
privileges (such as government support in the form of
deposit protection, etc.) but also special purposes and
duties—in particular a duty to consider the social good.
According to Friedman’s model, the sole purpose of a
company, beyond compliance with law and with ethical
prohibitions, is maximization of shareholder profit.
Because of the special relationship that the financial ser-
vices industry has with society, Friedman’s model cannot
be appropriate for this sector. We should allow that there
are emergent social goals for big banks, goals which relate
to social goods, and which emerge because of the complex,
reciprocal relationship that big banks have with society. If
this is correct, then we should ask how banks can more
effectively serve their social goals.
Rethinking the Nature of CSR in Financial
Institutions
Carrroll (1991) sets out what he calls ‘‘The pyramid of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)’’, whereby:
1. Society requires firms to meet legal responsibilities
2. Society requires firms to meet economic/business
responsibilities
3. Society expects firms to meet ethical responsibilities
4. Society desires firms to meet philanthropic
responsibilities
De Bruin rejects the pyramid, because, following
Friedman, he rejects any requirement for CSR. We agree
with de Bruin that the pyramid model should be rejected.
But our reasons are the opposite of his.
We accept CSR. What we object to in the pyramid
model is its tendency to generate a silo-mentality about
CSR. By this silo-mentality, we mean the presumption that
the lower levels of the pyramid can be formulated and
enacted without reference to any of the higher levels. In
contrast with the silo-model for CSR, a better model for
CSR is one where the ethical dimension of decisions is
integrated throughout the business. This integrated model
for CSR speaks against construing CSR as limited to phi-
lanthropic activities. Rather, the CSR activities of a firm
should promote societal values through the appropriate
deployment of the firm’s expertise and assets. We suggest
that CSR in banks should be more like the pro bono work
undertaken in the legal sector, where practitioners not only
contribute their time or money to worthy causes but also
utilize their professional skills for the wider good.
Rethinking the nature of CSR in the financial sector
along these lines could provide a new way to ameliorate
problems surrounding financial literacy and thus provide a
way to address the problems of epistemic asymmetry that
de Bruin rightly identifies in this area.11 For instance, as
part of their CSR requirements, firms might be encouraged
or required to provide basic financial education and
impartial advice to the poorest sectors of society, in order
to ensure that financial knowledge and understanding (and
not just access to information) are improved.12 If banks
took on this role in conjunction with existing bodies that
enjoy high levels of public confidence and trust, such as the
Citizens Advice Bureau, and if bank employees doing this
work were removed from any distorting pressures relating
to selling or product placement, we think that banks’ taking
up this proposal and in a conscientious spirit could provide
a significant step on the road towards re-establishing war-
ranted public trust in banks. If banks helped to address the
chronic lack of basic financial advice for those on the
lowest income levels, this would help to restore and renew
the social relationship for banks.
Another practical step that might follow from recon-
ceiving the relationship between banks and wider society
concerns the nature of penalties for misbehaviour. Cur-
rently the primary sanction for serious misbehaviour
involves ever-increasing levels of financial penalty. Yet
increased fines do not seem to be preventing scandals, and
Footnote 9 continued
and yet which could offer many of the products and services banks
offer more cheaply and easily.
10 See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_421524.pdf.
11 Despite significant government initiatives in this area (at least in
the UK), there is reason to think that financial literacy in general
remains poor. For example, a 2016 survey by the UK-based Money
Advice Service found that a third of 16–17 year olds surveyed had
never put money into a bank account and that two in five didn’t even
have a current account (see https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/
blog/the-kids-aren-t-alright-just-40-are-taught-money-skills-at-
school).
12 Advice and training here might include looking at how to record
and monitor income versus outgoings, how to balance holding savings
whilst also running a credit card balance, the different kinds of risk
associated with different kinds of financial product and, crucially, the
investment options for pensions. In this regard, we would highlight
programmes like Lloyds ‘‘Money for Life’’ (see https://www.money
forlifeprogramme.org.uk/) as a hugely positive step, but argue for the
provision of this kind of service for low income adults as well as sixth
form students.
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public trust continues to be strikingly low. An alternative
model, if the rules that govern banks were construed as
ways to maintain social cohesion and to benefit all of
society, would be to offer an alternative response to mis-
behaviour. Instead of a simple fine, firms should instead be
required to pay for remedial exercises where staff are
encouraged and enabled to reflect on the rules in place,
exploring the reasons those rules exist and assessing the
true cost to society of flouting them.13 There is a useful
analogy to be drawn here, we feel, with recent moves in the
UK to promote compliance with road traffic regulations,
where offenders are offered, as an alternative to a fine plus
penalty points on the licence, the option of attending and
paying for a Speed Awareness Course. As AA DriveTech
states:
The National Speed Awareness Scheme aims to
reduce the speed at which people drive by encour-
aging them to alter their attitudes towards excessive
or inappropriate speed. Offered as an alternative to a
speeding fine and penalty points, it helps drivers to
gain a fuller understanding of why people drive above
the speed limit and the true potential consequences of
speeding.14
From a peak of 2,087,000 in 2005, the number of
speeding offences fell rapidly to 1,270,000 in 2009.
Although full research remains to be undertaken, the Par-
liamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety takes
speed awareness courses to have played a major role in this
reduction (see Speed and Safety: evidence from published
data, Mitchell 2012). We suggest that similar moves
should be considered to improve compliance with financial
regulation.
Bank employees, at all levels, need to be reminded,
especially when misbehaviour comes to light, why the rules
exist and who and what suffers if they are broken. And
bank employees need to be helped to improve their moral
sensitivity. An improved moral sensitivity should help
them in working through complex cases, where competing
moral demands are operative, to arrive at the right deci-
sions. (As de Bruin (2014: 261) notes ‘‘In order to do the
right thing…businesses have to gain knowledge about their
stakeholders [too]—that is, about the harms and benefits of
the firm’s operations to people affected by them’’.) Cer-
tainly, guided discussion in an atmosphere of cooperation
and patience and careful reflection can improve the ability
to identify moral issues, to structure relevant considera-
tions, and to avoid fallacies in moral reasoning.15 We
suggest that moral development, rather than the focus on
purely epistemic virtue which de Bruin advises, will help to
rebuild warranted trust in this sector and help to safeguard
against further scandals occurring.
Conclusion
There can be no guarantee that there will be no future
financial crises. Even now, the housing market hasn’t fully
corrected, and many companies (and countries and people)
have levels of debt that will not be sustainable if there are
significant rises in interest rates. Some prudent steps have
been taken by governments and regulatory bodies, such as
(1) increasing the capital requirements on banks, (2)
changes to the provision of bonuses, with greater clawback
potential, and (3) the introduction in the UK of the Senior
Managers Regime. Alas, very recently there have also been
steps backwards and there remains, we suggest, significant
work to be done on the culture within banks to prevent
further problems. Reflecting on the role that financial ser-
vices institutions play in western societies, on the special
privileges and duties banks have, and on taxpayers’ status
in at least some cases as lenders of last resort, people are
right to demand better behaviour within banks. People are
also right to want to see evidence that banks take more
seriously their commitment to the public good. The con-
crete steps we have outlined above are ways in which
banks can demonstrate that they are serious about such
improvements.
13 This would help to counter the well-known worry that no amount
of regulation will curb behaviour which seeks to game the rules and
indeed that regulation itself may actually encourage a climate of such
gaming. As Mayer (2013: 68) puts it ‘‘Since neither incentives nor
reputations can be relied on to align the interests of companies with
those of society more generally, we turn to third parties, namely
governments and regulators, to do this for us. However, all this does is
to promote the development of another profitable industry, namely
regulatory avoidance, and mechanisms for minimizing the impact of
regulation on the pursuit of private gains…The most significant
source of failure is [therefore] that we have created a system of
shareholder value driven companies whose detrimental effects
regulation is supposed to but fails to correct, and in response we
seek greater regulation as the only instrument that we believe can
address the problem. We are therefore entering a cycle of the pursuit
of ever-narrower shareholder interests moderated by steadily more
intrusive but ineffective regulation’’.
14 See http://www.theaa.com/aadrivetech/driver-awareness/speed-
awareness-course.html.
15 Carefully tailored courses that force attendees to think how they
could legitimately justify their decisions to someone face-to-face
would help to raise the ‘‘moral intensity’’ (see Jones 1991) of ethical
problems faced by bankers and others in financial services. That is to
say, guided group discussion could help people to reflect better on the
full moral dimensions of the issues they face, preventing courses from
descending into a mere tick-box exercise (as on-line ethics manage-
ment programmes are apt to do). The carefully tailored courses we
envisage could also help to support a return to the kind of professional
integrity stressed by O’Neill (2014).
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